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INTRODUCTION

The most pressing and compelling human rights crisis of our time is the
massive increase in displaced people over the past decade. There are now
more displaced people in the world than at any other time since the Second
World War.' Without any hint of exaggeration there is now a monumental
international crisis stemming from the more than sixty million people who
are now displaced. 2 Regrettably, there is nothing approaching even a
tenable, durable solution to this problem. The strain regarding so many
displaced people has been felt most acutely in Europe where there are
literally millions of people waiting to be hopefully absorbed.3 The likelihood
of absorption is greatly diminished following a reversal by Germany the
greatest recipient of refugees-regarding its appetite to absorb more
refugees.4 However, the crisis now extends to all regions.
In September 2016, then-United States President Barack Obama
convened a crisis summit in New York to attempt to find solutions to the
refugee crisis. 5 An important backdrop to this summit is that, since 1975, the
United States has resettled more than 3.2 million refugees and increased its
annual refugee intake from 70,000 to 110,000.6 The summit was co-hosted

by then-United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and a number of
countries who are regarded as discharging a considerable disproportionate
burden in accommodating refugees. 7 These countries include Sweden,

1.
U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT
IN
2015
5
(2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats
/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html [hereinafter UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT IN 2015].
2.
UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 2.
3.
See infra Part II.
4.
See Anthony Faiola, Germany Used to be the Promised Landfor Migrants. Now,

It's

Turning

Back

More

of

Them,

WASH.

POST

(Sept.

29,

2016),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany-used-to-be-the-promised-land-for-mi
grants-now-its-turning-back-more-of-them/2016/09/27/6b5c7a7a-7a7c-l 1e6-8064-c1ddc8a724
bbstory.html?utmterm=.efl43214cfce.
5.
See Tara John, World Leaders Meet at U.N. to Craft Response to Migrant Crisis,
TIME (Sept. 19, 2016), http://time.com/4499150/un-obama-refugee-summit-migrants/.
6.
Off. of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet on the Leaders' Summit on Refugees, WHITE
HOUSE (Sept. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov./the-press-office/2016/09/
20/fact-sheet-leaders-summit-refugees [hereinafter Fact Sheet on the Leaders' Summit on
Refugees].

7.

Id.
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Germany, Canada, and Mexico.' Fifty-two countries participated in the
summit.9 The summit followed UN talks several days before, which failed to
provide any tenable solutions.1 0 Ultimately, while the summit recognized the
desperate need to find ways of dealing with more than sixty million
displaced people, it fell well short of providing effective solutions."
Recently, the refugee crisis has been significantly exacerbated as a result of
U.S. President Donald Trump's January 27, 2017 executive order, which
bans indefinitely the admission of people fleeing Syria into the United States
and temporarily freezes the entry of other refugees for 120 days.1 2 A federal
district court enjoined the ban; however, following a request by the Justice
Department to reinstate the ban, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit upheld the freeze. 13 At the time of writing this Article, President
Trump had signed a revised executive order, which imposes a ninety-day
ban on citizens from six countries-Syria, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and
Yemen.1 4 Further, although the revised order removes the indefinite
suspension of Syrian refugee admissions, the order does place a freeze on all
refugee entries into the United States (under the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program) for at least 120 days.'5 Most notably, President Trump has reduced
the 2017 annual refugee quota set by the previous Obama Administration by
more than half-from 110,000 to 50,000 under the new order.' 6

8.
Id.
9. Id.
10. Julian Borger & Patrick Kingsley, Swift Response to Refugee Crisis Rests on Obama
Summit After UN Talks Fail, GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world
/2016/sep/18/refugee-crisis-rests-on-Obama-summit-un-talks-fail [hereinafter Borger].
11. The commitments given at the summit related to increasing financial aid and some
countries indicated they would slightly increase their refugee intake. However, it is clear that
these changes, albeit welcome, are only the starting point in terms of tackling the refugee
crisis. See generally G.A. Res. 71/1 (Sept. 19, 2016).
12. Michael D. Shear & Helene Cooper, Donald Trump Freezes Refugee Program,
Orders New Vetting for Entry, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Jan. 29, 2017),
http://www.smh.com.au/world/donald-trump-freezes-refugee-program-orders-new-vetting-forentry-20170128-gu0id6.html.
13. Adam Liptak, Court Refuses to Reinstate Travel Ban, Dealing Trump Another Legal
Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/politics/
appeals-court-trump-travel-ban.html.
14. Glen Thrush, Trump's New Travel Ban Blocks Migrantsfrom Six Nations, Sparing
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/us/politics/travel-banmuslim-trump.html [hereinafter Thrush]; see Off. of the Press Sec'y, Executive Order
Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, WHITE HOUSE
(Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/06/executive-orderprotecting-nation-foreign-terrorist-entry-United-States [hereinafter Executive Order Protecting
the Nation].
15. Executive Order Protectingthe Nation, supra note 14.
16. See Executive Order Protectingthe Nation, supra note 14; Thrush, supra note 14.

Published by Scholar Commons, 2017

3

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 5
124

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6 9: 121

The key basis upon which displaced people have been settled since
World War II (WWII) is the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Convention). While the Refugee Convention is the
international instrument which has guided the absorption of more refugees
than any other document or agreement, it has been well-recognized that it is
no longer adequate to deal with the scale and nature of the current crisis. At
the same time, it is clear that no international consensus will be reached
regarding a wide-ranging and effective response to the refugee problem.
Accordingly, the operation and application of the Refugee Convention is
more important now than at any time since the drafting of the document.
There are several key reasons why the Refugee Convention is not a
holistic solution to the refugee problem. One of these reasons obviously
relates to the willingness of countries to absorb a far greater amount of
refugees than they have done historically. There are also significant legal
limitations relating to the Convention which potentially can considerably
curtail the number of people who can request asylum under the document. In
particular, the Refugee Convention does not on its face apply to all destitute
and displaced people. The only people who can qualify as refugees under the
Convention are those who are at risk of persecution in their homeland for
one of five specified reasons. These reasons are race, nationality, religion,
political opinion, and membership of a particular social group.' 7 Displaced
people who do not come within the scope of one or more of these five
grounds are automatically precluded from invoking the Refugee Convention
as a basis for making a claim for asylum in another country. As a result, the
interpretation and meaning of these five grounds is more important now than
at any other time in human history.
In this Article, I examine the context, background, and meaning that
should be accorded to one of these grounds, namely, membership of a
particular social group. I focus on this ground because it is the one that is
most obscure and devoid of clear jurisprudential analysis. In addition, this
ground also potentially offers the greatest prospect of a wide interpretation,
thereby potentially resulting in large numbers of asylum seekers being able
to increasingly rely on the ground. By way of summary, I conclude that the
meaning previously associated with particular social group is far too narrow
and under-inclusive. A much broader meaning is appropriate in light of the
historical origins of the Refugee Convention and the purpose of the
agreement. So I propose a new, wider definition. Expanding the scope of this
term will result in a far greater number of displaced people being able to

17. See infra Part III.
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base their claim for asylum on a ground within the scope of the Refugee
Convention.
I also propose a second reform that will significantly reduce the number
of displaced people in the world. Many countries, including the United
States, settle two main categories of refugees. The first category is onshore
refugees. These are asylum seekers who manage to enter the country in
question generally by airplane, but sometimes by boat or by crossing a land
border. Generally speaking, onshore refugees constitute the highest portion
of asylum seekers who are settled in third countries. The second category of
refugees are offshore refugees. These are people who are often in refugee
camps and generally lack the mobility to travel to refugee-accepting
countries.
The United States has an annual refugee quota, which was set at
110,000 for 2017." However, as noted above, in recent days President
Trump has halved this quota. The peak quota was 142,000 in 1993.19 The
refugees that are settled onshore are called asylees, and their numbers vary
from year to year. The most recent data shows that in Fiscal Year 2015,
26,124 asylees were granted asylum. 20 The quota does not include asylees to
which there is no limit in granting protection. 21 The United States should
considerably increase the amount of offshore refugees it settles. This is
essential due to the considerable spike in international displaced people and
is also commensurate with the capacity of the United States to absorb and
resettle destitute people. The United States should also increase its quota of
offshore refugees to 500,000. It should do so in a stepwise, methodical
manner with an increase of 50,000 per year. Not only would this immensely
improve the flourishing of thousands of destitute people, it would also make
the United States the world's moral leader in providing a humanistic solution

18. Presidential Determination on Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2017, 81 Fed.
Reg. 70, 315 (Sept. 28, 2016). The President, following consultation with Congress,
determines the annual refugee ceiling and its regional allocation in accordance with INA
§ 207(a). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE ADMISSIONS FOR
FISCAL YEAR 2017: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/262168.pdf.
19. Jie Zong & Jeanne Batalova, Refugees andAsylees in the United States, MIGRATION
POL'Y INST. (Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-asyleesunited-states.
20. NADWA MOSSAAD, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., REFUGEES AND ASYLEES:
2015, at 1 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees Asylees
2015.pdf.
21. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RES. SERV., REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND RESETTLEMENT
POLICY 2, n.8 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf ("Asylees are not included in
the refugee ceiling. There are no numerical limitations on the granting of asylum.").
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to the current displaced person crisis. In due course, it is hoped that other
countries would follow this example and increase their refugee quota.
In Part II of this Article, I provide an overview of the current crisis
regarding displaced people and put this into historical perspective. Part III
follows with a discussion of the history and current status of the Refugee
Convention, including an explanation of its limitations relating to its
capacity to house all displaced people. In Part IV of this Article, I provide an
overview of the background and context relating to the most nebulous
refugee ground membership of a particular social group. Part V of this
Article is a jurisprudential analysis regarding the meaning and scope that
should be attributed to particular social group. In Part VI, I propose that the
United States should considerably increase its offshore refugee intake. I also
analyze the implications of my proposals on displaced people and refugeeaccommodating countries. In the concluding remarks, I summarize the main
recommendations in this paper and the impact that they are likely to have on
the numbers of displaced people.
II.

THE CURRENT DISPLACED PERSON CRISIS

A.

Overall Picture Regarding the Current Number of Displaced
People

Recorded human history has long documented the existence of people
who are displaced from their homeland and have no place to live. 22
However, the extent of this phenomenon is now at unprecedented levels.
Global forced displacement has continued to increase, with more people
forced from their homes by war, conflict, generalized violence, and
persecution since WWII. 23 The global population of forcibly displaced
people today is larger than the population of the United Kingdom.24 In fact,
if the total global population of forcibly displaced people today combined to
form their own country, it would be the 21st largest country in the world.25
The starkest figures are set out in the UNHCR Global Trends Report
(UNHCR Report), which notes that at the end of 2015, 65.3 million
individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide-increasing for the fifth

22.

See generally Gilbert Jaeger, On the History of the International Protection of

Refugees, 83 INT. REV. RED CROSS 727 (2002).
23. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 5.
24. Id. at 6 (citing U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION
PROSPECTS: THE 2015 REVISION (2015)).
25. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 6.
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consecutive year. 26 This equates to 1 in every 100 people worldwide being
displaced from their homes, the highest ratio since 1951 when the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) began collecting data
on displaced persons. 27

This is 5.8 million more refugees and displaced individuals than the
previous year (59.5 million). 28 The rate of increase at which the displaced
population is growing is marked over the most recent five-year period. 29
According to UNHCR data, there were 42.5 million forcibly displaced
people recorded worldwide in 2011.30 This is a 50% increase in only five

years.3' Approaching the issue from a somewhat wider lens further
highlights the current extent of the crisis. In 1996, there were 37.3 million
displaced persons recorded worldwide.32 Thus, the rate of displacement has
been rapidly growing over the last twenty years.
There are a number of different cohorts that make up the global figure of
displaced persons. Broadly, they consist of refugees who account for about
21 million of the displaced persons; internally displaced persons (IDPs) who
account for approximately 41 million people; and finally, asylum seekers
who account for slightly more than 3 million people. 33 The main entity or
institution that monitors and has a broad supervisory or caretaker function in
relation to asylum seekers is the UNHCR. 34 Its oversight of displaced people
has grown to 52.6 million, compared to 46.7 million at the end of 2014.35
The below table from the UNHCR sets out the large number and rapid
increase in displaced people. 36

26. Id. at 2, 20.
27. Phillip Connor, Nearly ] in 100 Worldwide Are Now Displacedfrom Their Homes,
PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Aug.
3, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/08/03/nearly-1-in-100-worldwide-are-now-displaced-from-their-homes/;
see
UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 2.
28. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 2.
29. See id. at 5.
30. Id.
31. The number of displaced persons was 45.2 million in 2012; 51.2 million in 2013;
and 59.5 million in 2014. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra

note 1, at
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

5.
Id at 6.
Id
See infra Part III.
UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 5.
Id at 6.
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B.

The Significant Recent Increase in the Number ofDisplacedPeople

The rapid increase in displaced persons is demonstrated by the
fluctuation in the most recent calendar year for which the number of
displaced people has been reported.
During the course of 2015, more than 12.4 million individuals were
forced to leave their homes and seek protection elsewhere; of this
number, 8.6 million remained within their own countries and around
1.8 million sought international protection abroad. In addition, 2.0
million new claims for asylum were made within the year.3
To further illuminate the marked rate at which the number of displaced
persons is increasing, in 2015, approximately twenty-four people in the
world became displaced every minute. 38 In other terms, every day over
34,000 people were forcibly displaced due to conflict or persecution.39 There
were only six persons newly displaced per minute in 2005.40
There have been a number of discrete events which have contributed
significantly to the growth in displaced people. For example, the rising
prevalence of displaced persons is particularly pronounced in the Syrian
Arab Republic. In 2015, there were a total of 11.7 million Syrians

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 5-6.
Id
Id
Id at 2.
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displaced both within and outside Syrian borders. 4' This figure is
composed of 4.9 million refugees, 6.6 million IDPs, and nearly 250,000
asylum seekers. 42 However, more recent data suggests that by mid-2016, the
total global number of displaced Syrians had already risen to 12.5 million. 43
Afghans, Colombians, Congolese, Iraqis, Nigerians, Somalis, Sudanese,
South Sudanese, and Yemenis also comprised significant populations of
displaced persons-each with over 2 million. 44
As noted above, one of the largest cohorts of displaced people is
refugees. The total number of refugees alone also increased for the fifth
consecutive year. 45 In the four-year period from 2011 to 2015 (inclusive),
the refugee population grew by 55% from 10.4 million to 21.3 million. 46
Further, the UNHCR notes that there were 16.1 million refugees registered
under its mandate in 2015.47 Strikingly, this is 1.7 million more recorded
refugees than the previous year. 48 As noted by the UNHCR Report, one of
the largest contributing factors to this exponential growth has been the
conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, which began in 2010.49 The Syrian
Arab Republic produced over half of the world's new refugees in 2015.50
There were also an additional 5.2 million Palestinian refugees registered by
the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). 5 1
The significance of the refugee crisis is further underlined by the fact
that, by the end of 2015, half of the world's refugees were children (5 1%).52
According to the UNHCR, in 2015, 98,400 asylum claims were made
worldwide by children who were either unaccompanied or separated from
their families. 53 The number of such applications made in 2014 was
34,300.54 Thus, this is nearly a threefold increase in a single year.55

41. Id. at 6.
42. Id
43. Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, About Six-in-Ten Syrians Are Now
Displaced from Their Homes, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (June 13, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/13/about-six-in-ten-syrians-are-now-displacedfrom-their-homes/.
44. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 6.
45. Id. at 13.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id
51. Id at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id
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C. Key Refugee and DisplacedPerson ProducingCountries
According to the UNHCR Report, developing countries are the top ten
refugee-producing countries.5 6 In fact, 12.2 million (76%) of the 16.1
million refugees registered under the UNHCR's mandate originated from
these ten countries alone in 2015.57 Further, most of these countries have
produced significant numbers of refugees for at least the past five years. For
example, Afghanistan has produced some of the largest numbers of refugees
for over thirty years.5 1

As mentioned above, the continued conflict in Syria has resulted in the
most profound refugee and displaced persons problem in the world. Six in
every ten Syrians are currently displaced this figure is unprecedented in
recent history for a single country. 59 In 2015 alone, there were over 1 million
newly registered displaced Syrian refugees.60 Thus, as mentioned above, by
the end of 2015 there were 4.9 million Syrian refugees worldwide, making
the Syrian Arab Republic the largest refugee-producing country. A
significant proportion of the total Syrian refugee population is hosted in
bordering countries-specifically Turkey (2.5 million), Lebanon (1.1
million), Jordan (628,200), Iraq (244,600), and Egypt (117,600).61 A
paradoxical feature relating to these host countries is that they are some of
the poorest and most unstable countries in the world. 62 The countries that
hosted the largest Syrian refugee population, not located in the bordering
region, were Germany and Sweden-115,600 and 52,700, respectively. 63
Syrians also accounted for the largest number of asylum applications
registered globally during 2015.64 A total of 373,700 new applications for
asylum were made, comprising 18% of the world's total number of
applications. This is compared to 12% the previous year. 65
Afghanistan remained the second largest refugee-producing country at
the end of 2015; at the time, the Afghan refugee population worldwide was

56.
57.
58.

Id. at 16.
Id
Id

59. Phillip Connor & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Key Facts About the World's Refugees,
PEW RES. CTR.:
FACT TANK (Oct.
5,
2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/10/05/key-facts-about-the-worlds-refugees/.
60. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 14.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id at 16.
See id.
Id
Id. at 40.
Id
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estimated at 2.7 million.66 A significant proportion of these Afghan refugees
sought protection in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran-1.6 million
and 951,100, respectively. 67 The third largest country of origin was Somalia,
with 1.12 million refugees worldwide in 2015.68 Notably, approximately
54
% of the world's refugees in 2015 originated from only these three
countries-Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan.69
The remaining top ten refugee-producing countries in 2015 were South
Sudan (778,700-compared to 616,200 a year earlier), Sudan (628,800), the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (541,500), the Central African Republic
(471,100), Myanmar (451,800), Eritrea (411,300), and Colombia
(340,200).70
D. Poor Countries Continuing to Shoulder a DisproportionateBurden
ofAdmitting DisplacedPeople
The trend of poor countries shouldering a disproportionate burden of the
refugee intake not only applies in relation to Syrian refugees but also to the
entire cohort of the refugee population. Turkey was host to the largest
refugee population for the second consecutive year hosting 2.54 million
refugees in 2015.7' This is also a significant increase from the 1.6 million
refugees it hosted in 2014.72 Pakistan and Lebanon were the second and
third largest refugee-hosting countries worldwide-1.6 million and 1.1
million refugees, respectively. 73 The below table sets out the top ten refugeehosting countries in 2015, which accounted for almost 60% of the total
number of refugees registered under the UNHCR mandate. 74

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 3.
Id at 16.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 3.

72. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT
IN
2014
(2015),
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/country/55672
5e69/unhcr-global-trends-2014.html
[hereinafter UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED
DISPLACEMENT IN 2014].
73. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 3.

74. Id at 15.
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Major refugee-hosting countries 2014 - 201 (end-yew}

For the third consecutive
year, developing
countries have
disproportionately hosted almost 90% of all refugees under the UNHCR's
mandate.'" By the end of 2015, developing countries hosted 13.9 million of
the total global number of refugees under the UNHCR's mandate.716
Moreover, the world's Least Developed Countries (LDCs) hosted 26% of
the world's refugee population-that is, 4.2 million refugees." This is in
stark contrast to the 2.2 million refugees that developed countries hosted."
The pattemn of wealthy countries failing to shoulder a reasonable burden
of the displaced person crisis is further highlighted in a recent report by
Amnesty Intemnational, which states that "wealthy countries have shown a
complete absence of leadership and responsibility, leaving just 10 countries,
which account for less than 2.5% of world GDP, to take in 56% of the
world's refugees."79 In fact, the world's six wealthiest countries (including

75. Id. at 18.
76. Id. at 15.
77. Id. There are currently forty-seven countries classified by the UN as least developed
countries (LDCs) according to their low level of gross national income per capita, level of
human capital, and economic vulnerability to economic and environmental shocks. For a list of
the world's least developed countries, see LDCs at a Glance, U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SOC.
AFFAIRS, https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/Uploads/sites/45/publication/

Idc_1ist.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
78. UNHICR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 18.
79. Rich Nations' Self-Interest Means Refugee Crisis Set to Get Worse, Not Better,
AMNESTY INT'L (Oct. 4, 2016, 12:10 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/en/1atest/news/
2016/10/refugee-crisis-set-to-get-worse/; see AMNESTY INT'L, TACKLING THE GLOBAL
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the United States) hosted less than 9% of the world's total refugee and
asylum seeker population in 2015, according to a recent OXFAM report.80
Despite accounting for over half of the global economy (56.6%), the United
States, China, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom combined
hosted only 2.1 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2015; Germany
hosted the largest share of this population (736,740).1

To further complete the picture regarding countries that most drastically
increased their refugee intake in 2015, Turkey registered the largest number
of new refugees within its borders in 2015, including 946,800 from the
Syrian Arab Republic.82 Russia was the second largest host of newly
displaced refugees in 2015, with 149,600 Ukrainian refugees seeking
protection within the country. The third largest number (132,400) of
refugees sought protection in the United Republic of Tanzania as a result of
violence and conflict in neighboring Burundi. 8 3 The UNHCR Report also
notes that Ethiopia, Rwanda, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Uganda registered significant numbers of new refugees in
2015.84
A similarly dispiriting picture emerges regarding IDPs, which constitute
the highest number of displaced people. The total number of IDPs in 2015
was unprecedented almost 41 million. 5 This is 2.6 million more IDPs than
in 2014.86 Once again, the countries in which this crisis is occurring are
overwhelmingly impoverished countries with fragile political and rule of law
institutions. In 2015 alone, 8.6 million people were newly displaced within
their own countries as a result of conflict and violence. 87 UNHCR statistics
show that 84% of the world's new IDPs were located in only six countries in
2015." The country with the highest number of new IDPs was Yemen,

REFUGEE

CRISIS:
FROM
SHIRKING
TO
SHARING
RESPONSIBILITY
(2016),
https://prod.amnesty.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Tackling-the-global-refugee-crisisFrom-shirking-to-sharing-responsibility.pdf.
80. OXFAM INT'L, A POOR WELCOME FROM THE WORLD'S WEALTHY 1 (2016),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file attachments/mb-a-poor-welcome-refug
ees-180716-en 0.pdf.
81. Id. at 3. The United States hosted 559,370 refugees and asylum seekers; China
hosted 301,729; France hosted 336,183; United Kingdom hosted 168,937; and Japan hosted
16,305.
82. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 14.
83. Id
84. Id.
85. Id. at 29.
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Id at 30.
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where 10% (2.5 million people) of its population was internally displaced in
one year. 89

This data shows the continuation of an unremitting pattern whereby the
countries that can least afford to absorb and accommodate new arrivals are
the ones that are continuing, in increasing numbers, to take in new refugees.
A similar picture emerges in relation to asylum seekers. An asylum
seeker is an individual who has sought asylum protection but whose claims
have yet to be assessed. 90 The UNHCR Report states that at the time of the
report, approximately 3.2 million asylum applications were yet to be
determined. 9' Notably, 2015 saw the highest number of asylum claims
submitted in a single year 2.45 million. 92 This compared to 1.66 million in
2014 represents a 58% rise in one year. 93 Further, a considerable proportion
of the asylum applications lodged in 2015, over 2 million, were new
applications lodged by individuals for the first time. 94
The contrast between refugees and asylum seekers is not so much the
general source of these respective communities, but rather the destinations
where they are seeking to locate, which are invariably first world, wealthy
countries. The country that registered the highest number of new individual
asylum applications in 2015 was Germany, with 441,900 claims made. 95
This is an increase of 255% from 2014 when 173,100 people applied for
protection in the country. 96
E.

Overview of the United States' Response to Accepting Displaced
People

While most of the top refugee-producing countries have been very
remote from the United States, and the United States has not been
significantly affected by the refugee crisis, there was a considerable rise in
people seeking protection within the United States. 97 According to the
UNHCR Report, the United States received the second highest number of

89. Id at 29-30 ("Other countries highlighted in the report as having a large IDP
population included Iraq (808,700), Ukraine (800,000), Sudan (639,500), the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (637,900) and Afghanistan (492,600).").
90. Id. at 37.
91. Id. at 2.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 37.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 38.
96. See id.
97. Id.
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new asylum applications in 2015-172,700 compared to 121,200 in 2014.98
This is a 42% increase. 99 Over half of these new asylum applicants originate
from Central America, specifically Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala' 00 -an area considered one of the most violent in the world
largely due to the prevalence of gang-related crime.' 0' Almost 50,000 of
these asylum applicants originate from these three countries alone.1 02 A
large number of new asylum claims were also made in Sweden and Russia in
2015, 156,000 and 152,500, respectively.1 0 3
The United States received 84,995 refugees in 2016, effectively meeting
the 85,000 ceiling set by the Obama Administration at the beginning of the
year.1 0 4 The Democratic Republic of the Congo (16,370), Syria (12,587),
and Myanmar (12,347) were the top countries of origin of refugees in
2016.105 Together, refugees from these three nations represented nearly half
(49%) of all refugees admitted to the United States over the past year.1 06
The above data illustrates a humanistic crisis of almost incalculable
magnitude. The crisis is getting worse, and there is no obvious solution. The
crisis is reflected not only by the tens of millions of people who are
displaced and in desperate need for a new homeland, but is exacerbated by
the fact that the countries that are providing temporary accommodations to
displaced people are overwhelmingly developing countries that have no
capacity to provide meaningful levels of resources that are essential to
human subsistence, such as access to healthcare, education, and housing.
In the remainder of this Article, I examine whether the international
instrument, which has been the substratum against which more displaced

98. Id.
99. Id
100. Id; see Nora Sturm, UNHCR Callsfor Urgent Action as Central Asylum Claims
Soar, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES (Apr. 5, 2016), http://www.unhcr.org/enau/news/latest/2016/4/5703ab396/unhcr-calls-urgent-action-central-america-asylum-claims-so
ar.html (explaining the origination of new asylum applicants).
101. For a discussion of the violence and crime in this region, see Joshua Partlow, Why
El Salvador Became the Hemisphere's Murder Capital, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/05/why-el-salvador-becamethe-hemispheres-murder-capital/?utmterm=.6695dbb3d9b5;
Danielle Renwick, Central
America's Violent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 19, 2016),
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle.
102. See Partlow, supra note 101; see also Sturm, supra note 100 (totaling the number of
asylum applicants from Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala).
103. UNHCR, GLOBAL TRENDS: FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN 2015, supra note 1, at 38.
104. BRUNO, supra note 21, at 2.
105. Ruth Igielnik & Jens Manuel Krogstad, Where Refugees to the U.S. Come From,
PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/
02/03/where-refugees-to-the-u-s-come-from/.
106. Id.
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people have been settled than any other instrument in history, can be adapted
to provide at least part of the solution to the current displaced person crisis. I
also set forth reasons why the Unites States should admit a far higher
number of refugees. Prior to doing so, I examine the history, background,
and current status of the Refugee Convention.
III. BACKGROUND TO THE REFUGEE CONVENTION

Mass refugee movements have been an enduring global issue throughout
the twentieth century. 0 7 In this part of this Article, I provide a brief
historical review of international refugee protection and begin by looking
back to refugee agreements made during the first half of the twentieth
century. This is important because to understand the scope and potential
application of the Convention, it is necessary to first examine its origin and
history.
A.

The FirstAgreements

The twentieth century was a period of mass disturbance and movement
on a large global scale following numerous political events and violent
conflicts in Europe.'0o Governments were particularly ill-prepared for the
mass population flows that arose following the First World War, and in the
absence of protection obligations on governments or the existence of a
central body, legal responses by governments to the displaced person crisis
was not regular or systematic. Rather, those displaced by the war were left
largely dependent on the material assistance and relief provided by
charitable organizations.109
These displaced persons drew the attention of the international
community because "they numbered millions, not thousands,""1 0 and the
crisis was further "magnified by the fact that Europe was drained by war;
stirred by political tensions; and exhausted of capacities to provide adequate
relief.""' Thus, although refugees existed prior to this time, large groups of
refugees were virtually non-existent, and there was no need for governments

107. See generally CLAUDENA M. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE: THE
EMERGENCE OF A REGIME (1995) [hereinafter SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE].

108. Id.
109. Jaeger, supra note 22, at 728.
110. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 13.
111. Alessandra Roversi, The Evolution of the Refugee Regime and Institutional
Responses: Legaciesfrom the Nansen Period,22 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 21, 23 (2003).
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to clearly delineate the meaning and scope of a "refugee" or establish formal
institutions to provide for their protection and relief.
In response to the mass migration of refugees during and following the
conclusion of the First World War, the League of Nations was established in
1919 out of the Treaty of Versailles.11 2 Its primary purpose was "to promote
international co-operation and to achieve international peace and
security." 113 Thus, the League of Nations was the first intergovernmental
organization to address refugee issues, and its establishment subsequently
marked the beginning of the inter-war era of refugee protection that was
marked by a series of refugee flows.114

The conclusion of the First World War in 1917 also coincided with the
beginning of the mass exodus of Russians following the events of the
Russian Revolution and the collapse of the Russian Empire." By 1921, it is
estimated that over 1 million refugees displaced from Russia were displaced
abroad, making up the largest post-war group of refugees.11 6 Their situation
was desperate-for the most part, they were without identity or travel
documents and thus were unable to identify themselves, work, or travel. 117
They had little possibility of repatriation by the new Soviet authorities, who
made those Russians who fled the Revolution stateless." 8
Further, the mass movements of at least 1 million Russian refugees,
scattered across Europe after fleeing the Bolshevik regime, were exacerbated
by the fact that governments worldwide continued to be increasingly
reluctant to admit refugees and other immigrants following the conclusion of
World War I (WWI). "9 As noted by James C. Hathaway, "freedom of
international movement accorded to persons broadly defined as refugees
came to an abrupt halt after the First World War" 20 following the
implementation of more guarded immigration policies by governments in an

112. See generally League of Nations Covenant.
113. Id
114. For a historical overview of the creation of the League of Nations, see Claudena M.
Skran, Profiles of the First Two High Commissioners, 1 J. REFUGEE STUD. 277 (1988)
[hereinafter Skran, Profiles].

115. Id
116. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 33. However, it is
noteworthy that estimates in relation to this vary significantly. See generally EVAN
MAWDSLEY, THE RUSSIAN CIVIL WAR (1987); DANItLE JOLY & CLIVE NETTLETON,
REFUGEES IN EUROPE: THE HOSTILE NEW AGENDA (1990); JOHN C. TORPEY, THE INVENTION
OF THE PASSPORT: SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP & THE STATE (2000).

117. James A. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in InternationalLaw: 19201950, 33 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 348, 351 (1984) [hereinafter Evolution ofRefugee Status].
118. Id
119. Id. at 350-51.
120. Id. at 348.
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attempt to tighten their borders and control the movements of refugees.121
Movement restrictions began in the United States with the enactment of the
1924 Immigration Act that imposed the first numerical quota on immigration
to the United States.1 22 Thus, the imposition of border restrictions was a
continuing, significant obstacle facing the refugee crisis during the inter-war
period in Europe.
In response to the crisis facing Russian refugees, the International Red
Cross Committee (IRCC), unable to deal with the population flows,
appealed to the Council of the League of Nations in February 1921 to deal
with the "Russian refugees scattered throughout Europe without legal
protection or representation."1 23 The IRCC appealed to the Council on the
basis that the need for action was an issue that went beyond humanitarian
duty and was rather "an obligation of international justice,"1 24 and that the
League of Nations was "the only super national political authority capable of
solving a problem which is beyond the power of exclusively humanitarian
organizations."1 25

The move by the Red Cross to frame the refugee crisis in juridical and
legal, rather than strictly humanitarian terms, encouraged a positive response
from the Council which established the office of High Commissioner for
Refugees after consulting with member governments.1 26 The Council
appointed Dr. Fridtjof Nansen to the newly created post of "High
Commissioner on Behalf of the League in Connection with the Problems of
Russian Refugees in Europe" in 1921.127 The High Commissioner's mandate
included defining the legal status of Russian refugees, organizing their
repatriation or employment outside of Russia, and organizing measures to
provide for their assistance and relief.1 28 The High Commissioner's office
was intended to be a temporary agency for dealing with the problems created
by Russian refugees and subsequent civil war (1917-1922), though it
established what eventually became the basic structure of the UNHCR.

121. See id.; see also SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107; Louise
W. Holborn, The Legal Status ofPoliticalRefugees, 1920-1938, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 (1938)
[hereinafter Holborn, The Legal Status ofPoliticalRefugees].
122. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 33.
123. Evolution of Refugee Status, supra note 117, at 351 (quoting the International Red
Cross Committee appeal to the Council of the League of Nations in February 1921).
124. Id.
12 5. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Skran, Profiles, supra note 114, at 280.
128. Evolution ofRefugee Status, supra note 117, at 351. For a detailed overview of the
High Commissioner period, see generally BRUNO CABANES, THE GREAT WAR AND THE
ORIGINS OF HUMANITARIANISM, 1918-1924 (2014).
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The establishment of the League of Nations and the appointment of the
High Commissioner marked an awareness by governments as to the
international nature of the refugee problem and ultimately led to the creation
of a number of legal international instruments attempting to afford some
degree of protection to the refugees of the inter-war period.
The first such legal instrument addressing the international protection of
refugees was the Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of Certificates of
Identity to Russian Refugees (1922 Arrangement). 129 The High
Commissioner devoted particular attention to securing the legal protection
and status of refugees during his mandate, and in July 1922 convened an
international conference in Geneva regarding the lack of internationally
recognized identification papers for Russian refugees.1 30
Under the terms of the 1922 Arrangement, governments could issue and
renew legal identity certificates to Russian refugees living within their
borders. These certificates became known as "Nansen passports."131
Although the certificates were not equivalent to a national passport in that
they did not grant citizenship rights or provide the right to return to the
country of issue (unless expressly granted), they did give refugees, who were
effectively stateless, a recognizable legal identity and allowed them to travel
internationally more freely to find better living conditions.1 32 However, they
were valid for only one year.1 33 Notably, this agreement was not a treaty but
simply a nonbinding agreement. These certificates were generally wellaccepted by governments and, as noted by Skran, "the beginning of
international refugee law can properly be dated to the creation of the Nansen
passport system." 134
In 1924, under the 1924 Plan for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to
Armenian Refugees, the High Commissioner extended the issuance of the
certificates to Armenian refugees who were displaced from the former
Ottoman Empire. 135 This arrangement essentially mimicked the 1922
Arrangement, allowing for the issuance of identity and travel documents to
refugees of Armenia. 136

129. Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian
Refugees, Jul. 5, 1922, 355 L.N.T.S. 238.
130. Skran, Profiles, supra note 114, at 280.
131. See Holborn, The Legal Status ofPoliticalRefugees, supra note 121, at 684.
132. See id.
133. See id.; SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 105.
134. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 105.
135. Plan for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees, May 31, 1924,
5 L.N.O.J. 969 [hereinafter 1924 Plan]; see SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra
note 107, at 105.
136. See Evolution ofRefugee Status, supra note 117, at 352.
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The subsequent 1926 Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of
Russian and Armenian Refugees (1926 Arrangement) made several
improvements to these earlier arrangements. 3 7 The most significant among
them was the inclusion of a "return" clause to the identity certificates.138 As
mentioned above, the certificates were at first relatively limited; however,
the 1926 Arrangement recommended that the certificates make a provision
for a return visa. Thus, governments would undertake to re-admit the holder
to the country of issue in an effort to enable the "freedom of movement of
the refugees." 13 9 As a result, the identity certificates became increasingly
accepted as de facto passports. 140
However, under the 1922 and 1924 Arrangements, refugees were simply
defined as "Russian" or "Armenian" refugees which presented a constant
difficulty for governments in identifying refugees entitled to the
certificates. 141 in response to this, the 1926 Arrangement expressly set out a
definition as to who is a Russian or Armenian refugee.1 42 However, the
definitions, which were proposed by the High Commissioner, were relatively
narrow.1 43 The 1926 Arrangement defined a refugee according to their
country of origin (namely, whether the refugee was of Russian or Armenian
origin) and required that the refugee be deprived of the "protection" of their
country of origin, and further, the refugee could not have acquired another
nationality.1 44 Nonetheless, the 1926 Arrangement became the first
international legal instrument to define a refugee, and the definitions were
eventually adopted by the 1933 Convention Relating to the International
Status of Refugees (1933 Convention).1 45
Under the 1928 Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other
Categories of Refugees of Certain Measures Taken in Favour of Russian and
Armenian Refugees, the Council of the League of Nations extended the legal
protections afforded under the certificate system to other categories of
refugees affected by war and thereby living in the same conditions as the

137. Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian
Refugees, May 12, 1926, 89 L.N.T.S. 47 [hereinafter 1926 Arrangement].
138. Id. at 49.
139. Id.
140. See Holborn, The Legal Status ofPoliticalRefugees, supra note 121, at 685-86.
141. See Evolution ofRefugee Status, supra note 117, at 353.
142. 1926 Arrangement, supra note 137, at 49.
143. See Evolution ofRefugee Status, supra note 117, at 353.
144. 1926 Arrangement, supra note 137, at 49.
145. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, 159
L.N.T.S. 199, 203 [hereinafter 1933 Convention].
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Russian and Armenian refugees. 146 Following an intergovernmental
conference on refugees in June 1928, governments agreed to extend the
issuance of the certificates to Assyrians, Assyro-Chaldean persons of Syrian
or Kurdish origin, as well as persons of Turkish origin.1 47 This continued to
reflect the ad hoc, category-oriented nature of classifying refugees according
to country of origin or group affiliation that was favored during this period.
A second agreement concluded under the League of Nations, following
the June 1928 intergovernmental conference, was the 1928 Arrangement
Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees (1928
Arrangement). 148 This arrangement was effectively an enhanced
arrangement on the legal status of Russian and Armenian refugees; however,
it differed markedly from the earlier arrangement with regard to one
fundamental aspect. The arrangement marked the League's first attempt to
confer a range of rights upon refugees. These rights included the recognition
of the refugees' personal status, including divorce and marriage rights, and
contained other favorable treatment including rights to work, protection
against expulsion, and equality in taxation. Notably, the arrangements prior
to 1928 did not establish any specific responsibilities for states other than
cooperation in the recognition of League of Nations documentation.1 49
These standards, however, were not legally binding; they were simply
recommendations. Ultimately, relying on goodwill to deal with the mass
population flows was insufficient. By the 1930s, governments were plagued
with enormous political and economic instability, and thus had become
increasingly unwilling to accept many defined categories of refugees under
these arrangements. In an attempt to preserve any entitlements for their own
citizens, particularly those relating to the workforce, governments began
promulgating laws, unfavorable to refugees, particularly dealing with limits
on foreign workers and further restrictions on immigration and asylum
laws. 150

146. Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugees of Certain
Measures Taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees, Jun. 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 63.
147. Id. at 65.
148. Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees, Jun.
30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 53 [hereinafter 1928 Arrangement].
149. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 86 (2005) [hereinafter HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES].
150. Id. at 86-87; see SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at

122-24 (describing laws affecting refugees).
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The 1933 Refugee Convention

In reality, these earlier arrangements were ineffective in providing
solutions or relief to the ongoing mass movements of refugees and imposed
unfavorable conditions on them. As noted in a Secretariat memorandum,
"with the exception of the Nansen passport, the existing so-called
arrangements are producing practically no effect upon the position of the
refugees."'
Further, the League of Nations Intergovernmental
Commission, tasked with supervising refugee protection following the
cessation of the Office of the High Commissioner, argued "that the
stabilization of the legal status for refugees can only, owing to the very
nature of the steps to be taken, be brought about by a formal agreement
concluded by a certain number of states concerned."15 2
Accordingly, a draft convention was submitted at an intergovernmental
conference in Geneva in 1933 to secure the legal status of the refugee and to
seek a more permanent solution for the protection of refugees. 5 3 The
resultant 1933 Convention was applicable to Russian, Armenian, Assyrian,
Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish refugees. 5 4 It adopted the definitions set out
in the 1926 and 1928 Arrangements and guaranteed these refugees their
basic civil and economic rights.' These rights included those with respect
to identity certificates, education, taxation, expulsion, social welfare, and
labor conditions. 5 6 As highlighted by Hathaway, "it is noteworthy however,
that the 1933 convention guaranteed almost all refugee rights either
absolutely or on terms of equivalency with the citizens of most-favored
states.""' Thus, the 1933 Convention placed particular emphasis on
promoting the concept of equal or same treatment that governments should
accord to all refugees. However, the drafters seemed to be merely
consolidating earlier practices as many of the rights guaranteed in the

151. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 124 (quoting
Secretariat memorandum of 3 Feb. 1933. LNA R5614/686).
152. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 149, at 87 (quoting Work of the
Inter-Governmental Advisory Commission for Refugees during its Fifth Session and
Communication from the International Nansen Office for Refugees, May 22, 1933, 14
L.N.O.J. 854, 857).
153. Id
154. Id
155. 1933 Convention, supra note 145, at 203. Article 1 of the 1933 Convention states
that it is applicable to "Russian, Armenian, and assimilated refugees, as defined by the
Arrangements of May 12th, 1926, and June 30th, 1928." Id
156. For a detailed discussion on the rights and standards set out under the 1933
Convention, see SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 125-29. See
also HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 149, at 88.
157. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 149, at 88.
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Convention simply formalized or enhanced those in the 1928
Arrangement.'5 8
Importantly, the 1933 Convention was the first instrument to set a
binding obligation on signatory states in relation to expulsion and the nonrefoulement of refugees, which became increasingly common practice
during the 1930s.15 9 This principle means that governments should not expel
or return a refugee to their country of origin or any country against their will
if there is a risk of persecution this includes the refusal to admit someone
at the frontier. The right to non-refoulement is considered to be fundamental
to modem international refugee law.1 60
Ultimately, only eight states formally ratified and applied the provisions
of the treaty; however, many did so with reservations.161 Nonetheless, the
1933 Convention marked a significant milestone in the history of the
international refugee regime. It was the first legally binding, comprehensive
instrument addressing the legal protection and standard of conduct to be
accorded to refugees. It is also significant because it served as the basis of
the 1951 Refugee Convention.
In response to a number of specific world events between 1936 and the
adoption of the current refugee convention, a number of ad hoc treaties and
intergovernmental agreements were formulated in an attempt to provide
some measure of protection to the affected refugees. 162
C. Refugee Law Following the Second World War
The years that followed were dominated by dire economic events, and
the outbreak of further violent conflicts dampened the possibility of any

158. Id.
159. 1933 Convention, supra note 145, at 205. Although the obligation not to expel and
to avoid refoulement of Armenian and Russian refugees was first set out in the 1928
Arrangement, supra note 148, this obligation was in the form of nonbinding recommendations.
See SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 133.
160. U.N.
HIGH COMM'R
FOR
REFUGEES,
ADVISORY OPINION
ON
THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF NON-REFOULEMENT OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1951
CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 2 (2007).
161. See SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107, at 125; see also
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 149, at 88.
162. See generally SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE, supra note 107;
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES, supra note 149 (including two international treaties

concluded under the League of Nations concerning the protection of refugees from Germany
the Provisional Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, July
4, 1936, 171 L.N.T.S. 75 [hereinafter 1936 Provisional Arrangement] and the Convention
Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming From Germany, Feb. 10, 1938, 192 L.N.T.S. 61
[hereinafter 1938 Convention]).
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further ratifications of states to the Convention. In particular, the Second
World War marked a new era of mass exodus for millions of people. When
the war ended in 1945, there were more than 40 million displaced people
(the largest group displaced in history) who were reluctant or could not
return home because of border changes.1 63
In 1943, prior to the beginning of the war, the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established, and it relied on
cooperation and charitable funding by governments.1 64 Although it was not
created principally as a refugee organization, it had a wide-ranging mandate
to address the massive groups of refugees following the upheaval of
WWII.1 65 This included providing measures for their relief and repatriation

and assisting with the rehabilitation of war-torn areas.1 66
Following the conclusion of the war, the UNRRA assisted with the
repatriation of approximately 7 million people.1 67 However, the mandate of
the UNRRA was not extended past 1947 after its repatriation and
rehabilitation efforts were effectively hampered due to Cold War tension and
opposition from the Soviet Union.1 68 Further, the United States government,
which was responsible for providing the majority of the UNRRA funding,
refused to grant any further financial aid to the organization, effectively
vetoing the extension of its mandate.1 69 This was largely due to the United
States government's preference to replace the UNRRA with an international
body with a more wide-ranging capacity of operations and authority to deal
with the protection of refugees displaced in the aftermath of the war. 170
Subsequently, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was created
in 1947 by a resolution of the recently established United Nations General
Assembly. '' The IRO was initially established as a non-permanent
specialized intergovernmental agency of the United Nations and primarily
tasked with providing relief, repatriation, resettlement, and protection for the
approximately 1.5 million refugees left in Europe.1 72 However, unlike the

163. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES 2000:
FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 13 (2000) [hereinafter UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE
WORLD'S REFUGEES].
164. Id. at 13-14.
165. Id. at 14.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 16.
169. Id.; see Evolution of Refugee Status, supra note 117, at 372-73 (analyzing the U.S.
veto of the UNRRA funding).
170. Id. at 16.
171. Id.; Evolution ofRefugee Status, supra note 117, at 374.
172. UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 163, at 16.
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UNRRA, its efforts focused on the resettlement of refugees as opposed to
their repatriation. 17' Although its work was restricted to assisting displaced
European refugees, the IRO was the first international refugee body to fully
address all issues arising from the refugee crisis. 174 Ultimately, the IRO's
activities formally ceased in 1952 as a result of its inability to bring the
refugee crisis to an end with masses of people still adrift in Europe. 175 The
IRO was the last refugee organization to precede the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees. 176
D.

The 1951 Refugee Convention

By 1950, the international community recognized that the refugee
problem sparked by the Second World War was not a temporary one. A
more durable solution was necessary, especially given that there was no
obligation at the time on states to assist refugees. The only agreements
providing for refugee protection that were in place were those formulated
under the League of Nations and were created in response to specific events
that triggered significant refugee movements. Thus, it was recognized that
an instrument with a broader approach would be more effective in
addressing the ongoing refugee problem.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was drafted in
response to the problems confronting the international community as a result
of the mass displacement of people from Europe following World War II. 177
It was the first and remains the only binding refugee protection instrument of
a universal character.
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted by a
special United Nations conference on July 28, 1951, and came into force on
April 21, 1954. 178 The Convention was drafted by a combination of United
Nations organs, ad hoc committees, and a conference of plenipotentiaries
with the intent of ensuring that states could not again turn their backs on
vulnerable groups escaping persecution, as well as providing a guarantee of
non-refoulement.1 79

173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 17; see LOUISE HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION: A
SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS HISTORY AND WORK 1946-1952, at
559-75 (1956).
176. See infra Section III.E.
177. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jul. 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention].
178. Id.
179. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 6 (1st ed. 1991).
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The definition of refugee adopted by the Refugee Convention was
restricted to those persons who were displaced as a result of "events
occurring before 1 January 1951."Iso Further, it allowed signatory states to
elect to limit their obligations to refugees originating from "events occurring
within Europe."'' Thus, it is clear that the Refugee Convention was
originally drafted to directly respond to and assist displaced European
refugees who had been affected by the Second World War.18 2
However, in recognition of the continuing displacement of persons
across different parts of the world following events unrelated to WWII, the
Convention was subject to an amendment by the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol).' 83 The 1967 Protocol was entered
into force on October 4, 1967, and is an independent instrument from the
Refugee Convention. 184 Further, accession to it is not limited to those states
already party to the Convention. 8 5
The 1967 Protocol did not change the refugee definition in any material
way other than by removing the aforementioned temporal and geographical
limitations, and thereby strengthening the protection of refugees. Article 1(2)
of the 1967 Protocol states "for the purpose of the present protocol, the term
'refugee' shall . . . mean any person within the definition of Article 1 of the
Convention." 186
Article 1A(2) of the Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol,
mandates that refugee status be granted to:
any person who ... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.' 8 7
Thus, as the Refugee Convention stands today, the rights and
protections conferred by the Convention are extended to all refugees."'

180. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268
[hereinafter 1967 Protocol] (amending 1951 Refugee Convention).
181. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 177, at art. IB.
182. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS
175 (2nded. 2014).
183. 1967 Protocol, supra note 180.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supranote 182, at 1-2.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/5

26

Bagaric: Revisiting the Definition of Particular Social Group in the Refug

2017]

AMELIORATING THE DISPLACED PERSON'S CRISIS

147

Moreover, the 1967 Protocol did not broaden the Convention rights but
simply incorporated them by reference under Article 1(1). Thus, in effect the
aim of the amendment was to expand the scope of the Convention and allow
for the universal coverage of refugees.
However, the Convention definition applies only to specific types of
displaced people. In other words, to qualify for refugee status, an individual
must have a well-grounded basis for fearing persecution in their homeland.
The basis for persecution is not generic. It can be for only one of five
designated reasons.189 These reasons include race, religion, nationality,
political group, or membership of a particular social group.' 90 In addition to
this, in order for the Refugee Convention to apply, the individual must be
outside their country of origin.191
These limitations are very considerable. Imagine a person is outside his
country of origin and is almost certain to be killed if he returns to his country
of origin because of general conflict or because the person is being targeted
by powerful criminal gangs or corrupt government officials. Such a person is
not entitled to invoke the Refugee Convention.
Importantly, the 1951 Refugee Convention continues to provide the
guarantee of non-refoulement under Article 33. According to this principle,
refugees cannot be expelled or returned to a country where they may be
subject to persecution on account of their race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.1 92 However,
this right is not conferred upon refugees reasonably regarded as posing a risk
to national security or considered a danger to the community.1 93 The
Convention extends a number of other rights to refugees. For example,
refugees are entitled to the same rights as citizens in relation to freedom of
religion,1 94 intellectual property, 195 access to courts1 96 and legal
assistance,197 accessing elementary education,1 98 labor rights,1 99 and social
security. 200

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

1967 Protocol, supra note 180.
Id.
Id.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 177, at art. 33.
Id.
Id. at art. 4.
Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 16.
Id.
Id. at art. 22.
Id. at art. 24.
Id.
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As of April 2015, the total number of states party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention is 145 and those party to the 1967 Protocol is 146.201 The
number of states who are parties to both the Convention and the 1967
Protocol stands at 142.202 There are three countries (including the United
States) who have agreed only to the 1967 Protocol, and two small countries
who have agreed only to the Convention. 203 The Convention has been
responsible for settling more displaced people than any other international
instrument. Thus, despite the somewhat arbitrary limits imposed in the
Convention, it has proven to be an incredibly successful platform upon
which resettlement has occurred for millions of asylum seekers.
E.

The Role of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees
(UNHCR)

The UNHCR, replacing the IRO, was established by the UN General
Assembly with a three-year mandate beginning January 1, 1951.204 It was
initially tasked with the goal of providing protection and establishing
permanent solutions to deal with the refugee crisis. 205 As mandated under
Article 2 of the UNHCR Statute, the work of the High Commissioner "shall
be of an entirely non-political character; it shall be humanitarian and social
and shall relate, as a rule, to groups and categories of refugees." 206
UNHCR's mandate and its operations were repeatedly renewed to
address the ongoing refugee movements. 207 However, in 2003, the UN
General Assembly converted the UNHCR into a permanent independent
agency. 208
It is also important to note that the Refugee Convention and UNHCR
mandate were drafted at the same time. Thus, the framework of the UNHCR
was very much built upon and centered around the intentions reflected in the
Convention mainly to assist and seek protection for the European refugees

201. State Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the
1967 Protocol, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, http://www.unhcr.org/protectPRO
TECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf (last updated Apr. 2015).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 163.
205. Id. at 22.
206. Id. at 19 (quoting UNGA Res. 319 (IV) (Dec. 3, 1949)).
207. U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK:
DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 7 (revised Jul. 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/
46f7c0ee2.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK].
208. Id.
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displaced in the aftermath of the war. 209 However, as refugee movements
became larger and more complex, the Convention's refugee definition
presented significant limitations on the scope and activities of the UNHCR.
In response, the mandate of the UNHCR was extended by the General
Assembly to not only assist and monitor refugees but also displaced persons
who fell outside the scope of the Refugee Convention. 210 Although the
Convention definition itself was not broadened, the UNHCR's mandate was
broadened to provide assistance to a number of other categories of persons it
considers to be of concern. 2 11 This includes internally displaced persons,
stateless persons, asylum seekers, and returnees. 212
From a staff of thirty-four at the time of its founding, UNHCR now
employs a staff of 10,700 as of October 31, 2016. The agency is active in
over 128 countries, and its budget has grown from $300,000 in its first year
to more than $1 billion in the early 1990s and reached $7.2 billion in
2015.213 In 2015, UNHCR celebrated its 65th anniversary. 214
F. Summary ofInternationalRefugee Instruments
The above discussion shows that mass people movements are not new.
There have been several large waves of displaced people throughout the
twentieth century. On each occasion, countries that were affected by these
movements found tenable solutions to deal with the problem. At times the
solutions were ad hoc, while more recently they were more wide-ranging.
However, none of the solutions were perfect and none involved receiving
countries assuming legally enforceable obligations to accept displaced
people. The world is currently experiencing an unprecedented problem
associated with the forced movement of people. Unlike previous scenarios,
there seems to be very little appetite by sovereign states to increase their
intake of displaced people. It does not seem tenable that a new agreement or
arrangement will be reached that will foreseeably resolve or significantly
assist the current displaced people crisis. To the extent that some nations

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 163, at 24.
UNHCR RESETTLEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 207, at 8.
Id. at 13-14.
See Figures at a Glance, U.N.
HIGH COMM'R
FOR
REFUGEES,

http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/figures-at-a-glance.html

(last visited Aug. 25, 2017); see also

Donors Promise Initial US$ 687.2 Million for UNHCR Operations in 2016, the Highest
Amount Ever, U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/enau/news/press/2015/12/5671 1bf96/donors-promise-initial-6872-million-unhcr-operations-2016
-highest-amount.html.
214. See UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES, supra note 163, at 1.
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were willing to absorb significantly increased numbers of displaced people,
this approach seems to have irretrievably stalled. This is highlighted by the
reversal in Germany's approach to admitting displaced people. 215 In light of
that, part of the solution may involve a more expansive interpretation of the
existing Refugee Convention, and it is to that that I now turn.
IV.

THE MEANING OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

IN A NUMBER OF

REFUGEE COUNTRIES

A.

Overview of the Meaning ofParticularSocial Group

Membership of a particular social group is one of the five persecution
grounds as set out in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. 216 Article
1A(2) states:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "refugee" shall
apply to any person who:
(2) ... owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of
the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result
of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
return to it . . . .217
It has consistently generated the most debate. The interpretation of this
ground has been the most ill-defined persecution ground in the refugee
definition. It is also potentially the widest. Thus, the manner in which it is
interpreted can have immense ramifications for the capacity of displaced
people to obtain asylum in a country and also for the obligations of states to
absorb refugees within their borders.
There is relatively little precedent on the boundaries of particular social
group and that which does exist is subject to conflicting interpretations.
There is no uniform or consistent approach that has been taken on its
meaning. The difficulty in achieving a clear and definitive interpretation can

215. Faiola, supra note 4.
216. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 177, at art. 1A(2).
217. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/5

30

Bagaric: Revisiting the Definition of Particular Social Group in the Refug

2017]

AMELIORATING THE DISPLACED PERSON'S CRISIS

151

be seen across all jurisdictions, as it has generated considerable debate and
controversy and resulted in various interpretations. 218 As noted by Justice
McHugh of the High Court in Australia in ApplicantA & Another v Minister
for Immigration and EthnicAffairs & Another:
Courts and jurists have taken widely differing views as to what
constitutes "membership of a particular social group" for the
purposes of the Convention. This is not surprising. The phrase is
indeterminate and lacks a detailed legislative history and debate.
Not only is it impossible to define the phrase exhaustively, it is
pointless to attempt to do so. 2 19
One reason for this is the lack of interpretative guidance provided within
the Refugee Convention itself as to the intended meaning of the ground. As
is well-known, the Convention itself does not attempt to expressly define the
ground nor does it contain any specific list of groups that may constitute a
"particular social group" within the meaning of Article 1A(2). Further,
reference to the travaux pr6paratoires of the Refugee Convention is also
particularly unhelpful in ascertaining the meaning of the ground. In fact,
they show very little debate or insight as to the inclusion of the ground. All
that is recorded is the Swedish delegate's observation that: "Experience has
shown that certain refugees [have] been persecuted because they belonged to
ps groups. The draft convention made no provision for such cases, and one
designed to cover them accordingly should be included." 220
In effect, the term was added near the end of deliberations on the draft
convention as a last-minute addition with no clarity as to who the intended
beneficiaries of the provision were to be. 22 1
The lack of clarification in the Refugee Convention itself and within the
legislative history of the Convention regarding the meaning of particular
social group has resulted in a marked uncertainty regarding its scope and
meaning. There is also a considerable lack of consensus within the case law

218. See generally James C. Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Development: Membership of
a ParticularSocial Group, 15 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 477 (2003).
219. Applicant A & Another v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Another
(1997) 190 CLR 225, 259 (Austl.).
220. U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless
Persons, Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons:
Summary Record ofthe Third Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3 (Nov. 26, 1951).
221. It has been suggested that the ground was included to provide a basis for persons in
Eastern Europe during the Cold War and subject to persecution because of their social origins
to claim protection. See Richard Plender, Admission of Refugees, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 45,
52 (1977).
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on the meaning of a particular social group, as a number of different
approaches have emerged, even within the same jurisdiction, resulting in
often conflicting interpretations of particular social group. 222 Thus, the case
law merely adds to the uncertainty related to this concept.
Broadly, however, major common law countries-the United States,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have followed the
principled
"immutable
characteristic"
approach.
The immutable
characteristic approach examines whether a group shares an innate
characteristic or a characteristic that is so fundamental that it would be
unconscionable to force them to abandon or alter it. Australia, on the other
hand, has focused on the "social perception" approach. This approach
focuses on establishing the existence of a common characteristic that unites
group members, and in turn, they are objectively a cognizable group within
the society in question. The uniting characteristic or attribute does not need
to be "immutable." With respect to civil law jurisdictions, the case law
suggests that the particular social group ground has not been developed in
223
any meaningful or detailed manner.

Irrespective of the approach followed, the case law demonstrates that it
is widely accepted that it is not an essential condition that members of a
particular social group interact and behave as a group, nor is it necessary that
members are aware of the existence of other members to satisfy the
Convention's refugee definition. 224 Further, it is generally accepted that the
fact that a group may be united by persecutory conduct or the shared fear of
persecution cannot be the sole defining factor in establishing the existence of
a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention definition. One
must only demonstrate that a fear of persecution is based on his or her
membership in the group. Nevertheless, it has been suggested that it may be
a relevant factor in determining that the group is cognizable within
society. 225

222. See discussion infra Sections IV.C, IV.D, IV.E.
223. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection:
"Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, T 8, U.N. Doc.
HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR,
Guidelines on International Protection].
224. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An
Analysis of the Meaning of 'Membership of a Particular Social Group', in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS
ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Erika Feller et al., eds., 2003) [hereinafter Aleinikoff].
225. See discussion infra Section IV.D.
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I now examine in more detail the current approaches to defining
particular social group and recommendations regarding the preferable
approach to this concept.
B.

UNHCR Guidance

The UNHCR Handbook, although not legally binding, has long been
recognized as a leading source of practical guidance by courts in interpreting
and applying the Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol.22 6 However, it is
noteworthy that the UNHCR Handbook offers no real guidance as to what
test or groups may satisfy the ground, going only as far as to state that, "a
'particular social group' normally comprises persons of similar background,
habits or social status."

227

In an effort to provide some clarification, the UNHCR convened an
expert roundtable in San Remo in September 2001 to address the
interpretation and application of membership in a particular social group. 228
The seminar was attended by representatives "drawn from governments,
NGOs, academia, the judiciary, and the legal profession." 229
In May 2002, UNHCR issued the resultant UNHCR Guidelines on
International Protection (the Guidelines), which effectively updated the
UNHCR Handbook which was last edited in 1992.230 In the Guidelines, the
UNHCR recognizes that membership in a particular social group is the
protected "ground with the least clarity"; that it is being "invoked with
increasing frequency"; and further, that the ratifying history does not shed
any light as to which claimants may satisfy the ground. 23' Thus, the primary
objective of the Guidelines is to provide legal "interpretative guidance for

226. U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1992) [hereinafter UNHCR, Handbook].
227. Id. at T 77.
228. Summary Conclusions: Membership of a ParticularSocial Group, in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR's
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS
ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (Erika Feller et al., eds., 2003) [hereinafter Summary
Conclusions]. The seminar was part of the UNHCR's Global Consultations on the
International Protection of Refugees which began in 2000 and was designed by UNHCR to
review a broad range of issues relating to the mass refugee movements-including various
aspects of the Refugee Convention. For information on the Global Consultations on
International Protections, see generally Global Consultations General, U.N. HIGH COMM'R
FOR
REFUGEES,
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/globalconsult/3b95cbce4/globalconsultations-general.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2017).
229. Summary Conclusions, supra note 228.
230. UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 223.
23 1. Id. at 2, ¶ 1.
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governments, legal practitioners and decision-makers, including the
judiciary" in their understanding and application of the ground in assessing
protection claims of an applicant's well-founded fear of persecution based
on their membership in a particular social group.232 It also directs that "the
term membership of a particular social group should be read in an
evolutionary manner, open to the diverse and changing nature of groups in
various societies and evolving international human rights norms." 233
Although the ground "cannot be interpreted as a catch-all," 234 the
Guidelines ultimately propose a combination of the "protected
characteristic" and "social perception" approaches in establishing the
existence of a particular social group. 235 In other words, it proposes a "single
standard that incorporates both dominant approaches" to avoid gaps in the
protection of refugeeS 236-ultimately broadening the scope of the ground.
This reconciliation of approaches is reflected in the definition set out in
the Guidelines:
A group of persons who share a common characteristic other than
their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a group by
society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate,
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity,
conscience or the exercise of one's human rights.237
Further, the Guidelines recommend that:
If a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic
determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, further
analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is
nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that society. So, for
example, if it were determined that owning a shop or participating
in a certain occupation in a particular society is neither
unchangeable nor a fundamental aspect of human identity, a
shopkeeper or members of a particular profession might nonetheless

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

1.
2, ¶ 3.
2, ¶ 2.
2-3, TT 5-7.
3, ¶ 11.
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constitute a particular social group if in the society they are
recognized as a group which sets them apart.238
Accordingly, the Guidelines maintain that the existence of an immutable
characteristic will ultimately lead to the finding that the purported group is a
particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention
definition. However, where there is no immutable characteristic, the analysis
should then turn to the social visibility of the group. Thus, the social
perception approach acts as an alternative limb.
The Guidelines also confirm that the cohesiveness of a particular social
group is not a necessary requirement. 239 Further, the group "cannot be
defined exclusively by the persecution that members of the group suffer or
by a common fear of being persecuted" however, persecutory conduct may
still be considered.240
C.

United States ofAmerica

The Refugee Convention definition was first codified in domestic
United States law under the Refugee Act of 1980 24 1

described as "the most

comprehensive U.S. law ever enacted concerning refugee admissions and
resettlement." 242 The Act was largely intended to ensure United States
immigration law was consistent with its rights and obligations under the
Refugee Convention and, as such, incorporated a new definition of refugee
that was in line with the Convention's definition.243 The refugee definition is
now contained under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and
classifies a refugee as a person who is "outside the United States and is
unable or unwilling to return to his or her country of origin because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political

238. Id. at 4, ¶ 13.
239. Id. at 4, ¶ 15.
240. Id. at 4, ¶ 14.
241. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 201(a)(42)(A), 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The
United States did not sign the Refugee Convention; however, it adopted the obligations under
the Refugee Convention by accession to the 1967 Protocol. The 1967 Protocol explicitly
incorporated the convention's refugee definition.
242. Arnold H. Leibowitz, The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional
Concerns, 467 ANNALS AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 163, 164 (1983).
243. See Maryellen Fullerton, A Comparative Look at Refugee Status Based on
Persecution Due to Membership in a ParticularSocial Group, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 505
(1993).
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opinion"-as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980.244 However, as was the
case with the legislative history of the Convention, the United States
Congress did not provide any guidance or explanation as to the meaning
intended to attach to the particular social group ground. 245 As a result, the
definition of particular social group within the United States has been
predominately developed through determinations handed down by the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The BIA first took on the task of interpreting and identifying the
hallmarks of a particular social group in the seminal case of Matter ofAcosta
in 1985.246 In that case, the BIA rejected the purported particular social
group of taxi drivers in El Salvador who were members of a taxi cooperative
targeted by guerrillas. 247 In reaching their determination, the BIA put forth a
singular and somewhat narrow test to determine whether an asylee qualified
as a member of a particular social group. 248 The test, now known as the
"protected characteristic" approach, is based on the existence of an
immutable characteristic.249
After reviewing the drafting history of the particular social group
ground in the Refugee Convention and the work of commentators, the BIA
noted that this provided no relevant guidance and subsequently turned to the
traditional methods of statutory interpretation. Specifically, they relied on
the principle of ejusdem generis which, as the BIA explained:
We find the well-established doctrine of ejusdem generis, meaning
literally, "of the same kind," to be most helpful in construing the
phrase "membership in a particular social group." That doctrine
holds that general words used in an enumeration with specific
words should be construed in a manner consistent with the specific
words . . . . Those being: "race,"
"political opinion." 250

"religion," "nationality," and

Accordingly, the BIA turned to the four specific grounds enumerated
under the INA, as set out above, to identify central elements consistent
among them and found that "each of these grounds describes persecution

244. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101(a)(42)(A), 66
Stat. 163 (1952).
245. Fullerton, supra note 243, at 513.
246. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 212 (BIA 1985).
247. Id. at 225-33.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 233.
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aimed at an immutable characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond
the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to individual
identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed." 251
In observing a standard consistent with each of the four other grounds of
asylum, the BIA determined that a particular social group involved
persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group
of persons all of whom share a "common, immutable characteristic."252
More specifically, the particular social group ground is akin to the other
Convention grounds in that it restricts refugee status to individuals who fear
persecution or harm on the basis of innate characteristics that cannot be
changed or fundamental characteristics which, as a matter of conscience,
should not be required to be changed to avoid persecution.253
Thus, there are effectively two limbs to the immutability requirement
delineated by the BIA. Firstly, asylum protection is extended to any member
of a group whose common characteristic or attribute is unchangeable. The
BIA, by way of example, cites that "the shared characteristic might be an
innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances .

.

. a

shared past experience such as former military leadership or land
ownership." 254 Alternatively, although a trait may be changeable, it should
not be expected to be changed because it is truly fundamental to the
individual's identity or conscience. This effectively embraces an
unconscionability analysis in that requiring an individual to abandon or
change the trait would contravene their most fundamental human rights. 255
Although this aspect of the Acosta standard is not well-developed in case
law, possible examples of social groups that may satisfy this test include
individuals defined by their homosexuality. 256
By way of example, the BIA has found that the following are particular
social groups defined by either immutable or fundamental characteristics
under the Acosta standard: former members of the Salvadoran National
Police; 257 young women from a tribe in Togo who have not had female
genital mutilation that was practiced by that tribe and who oppose the
practice; 258 Iranian women who refuse to comply with the government's

251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Id
Id
Id

255. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 182 (explaining law of refugee status).

256. See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 1990).
257. Matter of Fuentes, 19 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 1988).
258. Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996).
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gender-specific laws and norms;2 59 and, as mentioned above, Cubans whose
sexual orientation is homosexual.260
Ultimately, the BIA rejected the claimed particular social group of taxi
drivers because the characteristic that defined the group (that is, their
occupation as taxi drivers) was neither immutable nor fundamental. 261 The
taxi drivers were free to change their occupations; further, it was not
unconscionable to require them to do so in order to avoid persecution or fear
of persecution. 262 The BIA recognized that "it may be unfortunate, that
[Acosta] either would have had to change his means of earning a living or
cooperate with the guerillas in order to avoid threats. However, the
internationally accepted concept of a refugee simply does not guarantee an
3
individual a right to work in the job of his choice." 26
Moreover, the BIA also confirmed that a particular social group cannot
be established on the grounds that the group is solely defined by persecution
or the fear of persecution.264
However, the clarity Acosta provided within the United States context
was, at the least, muddied in 2006 when the BIA set out additional factors
relevant to the particular social group analysis in Matter of C-A-.

265

The BIA began its analysis by reaffirming that members of a particular
social group must share a common, immutable characteristic. 266 It also
affirmed that "a past experience is, by its very nature, immutable, as it has
already occurred and cannot be undone." 267 The BIA also addressed the
cohesiveness and voluntary association of group members in a particular
social group and confirmed that neither is necessary to be established in
finding the existence of a particular social group. 268
However, according to the BIA in Matter of C-A-, the existence of a
protected characteristic does not necessarily go on to mean that all groups
that satisfy this requirement will constitute a particular social group because
they are not all cognizable within a society. 269 Thus, the BIA would also
consider in its analysis "the extent to which members of a society perceive

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993).
See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (BIA 1990).
Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 233-34 (BIA 1985).
Id.
Id. at 234 (citing ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 214 (1966)).
264. Id.
265. Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 956 (BIA 2006).
266. Id. at 955.
267. Id. at 958.
268. Id. at 956-57.
269. Id. at 958.
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those with the characteristic in question as members of a social group." 2 70 In
other words, a particular social group must also be perceived as a
recognizable and distinct group within the relevant society.
Notably, this was the first time the BIA made express reference or
consideration to the concept of "social visibility" in its particular social
group analysis. Further, the BIA did not acknowledge any departure from
the Acosta standard, rather it stated that its decisions had always "considered
the recognizability i.e. the social visibility, of the group in question." 271 To
support this assertion, the BIA noted a number of groups it had previously
found to constitute a particular social group on the basis of, not only that its
members shared a protected trait, but also that the protected traits were
"'highly visible' and 'recognizable' by others in the country in question,"
and as such were "generally easily recognizable and understood by others to
constitute social groups."272
Accordingly, the BIA began its analysis by applying the Acosta
formulation as the starting point for the social group analysis-that is,
whether the proposed social group shared an immutable or fundamental
characteristic. 273 The BIA held that it did not because of "the voluntary
nature of the decision to serve as government informants." 274 The BIA then
went on to consider the social visibility of the proposed group. In doing so, it
found that the group was not sufficiently distinct or recognizable in
Colombian society because "the very nature of the conduct at issue is such
that it is generally out of the public view." 275 Further, the BIA emphasized
that the claimant, in his capacity as an informant, intended "to remain
unknown and undiscovered" which did not support the notion that the group
was perceived as a distinct group within the relevant society. 276
Ultimately, the BIA held that the purported group of "drug informants"
did not constitute a particular social group for the purposes of INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A) due to the "voluntary nature of the decision to serve as a
government informant, the lack of social visibility of the members of the

270. Id at 957.
271. Id at 959.
272. Id. at 959-60; see Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social
Visibility" in Defining a "ParticularSocial Group" and its Potential Impact on Asylum
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 47, 64-65
(2008).
273. Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 955 (BIA 2006).
274. Id at 961.
275. Id. at 960.
276. Id.
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purported social group, and the indications in the record that the Cali cartel
retaliates against anyone perceived to have interfered with its operations." 277
Thus, key to the social visibility requirement is that the relevant
characteristic is significant pursuant to broad social perceptions, as opposed
to merely the victim or the persecutor.278
Further, the BIA considered a third element relevant to its particular
social group analysis: the "particularity" of the proposed social group. The
BIA did not-in any comprehensive manner-deal with this issue but
simply held that the group of non-criminal informants was "too loosely
defined" to meet the particularity requirements set forth by the court. 279 It
was again noteworthy that the concept of particularity had not previously
been articulated or considered by the BIA under the Acosta standard.
In 2007, the analysis under Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U- added further
confusion to the social group analysis.280 Although affirming the
requirement of an immutable or fundamental characteristic, the BIA's
analysis of the requirement was rather brief. The BIA noted that "wealth"
was a characteristic that can change and therefore is not an immutable
characteristic. 281 However, it did not fully address whether it is a
characteristic so fundamental that a person should not be required to change
or alter it. 282

The BIA then went on to reaffirm social visibility, as set out in Matter of
C-A-, as a factor relevant in determining the existence of a particular social
group.283 The BIA also emphasized that the social visibility of a group is
determined by examining the country of concern. 28 4 Thus, according to the
BIA, the group must be easily recognizable and distinct from others in the
relevant society.
Ultimately, the BIA found that the claimed group of affluent
Guatemalans were not a cognizable group within Guatemalan society
because "violence and crime in Guatemala appear to be pervasive at all
socio-economic levels." 285 Thus, the claimed group did not satisfy the social
visibility test. 28 6 The BIA also considered the particularity requirement

articulated in Matter in C-A-, stating:

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id at 961.
See Marouf, supra note 272, at 64-65.
Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. at 957.
Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007).
Id. at 73-76.
Id.
Id at 74.
Id.
Id at 75.
Id.
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The terms "wealthy" and "affluent" standing alone are too
amorphous to provide an adequate benchmark for determining
group membership. Depending upon one's perspective, the wealthy
may be limited to the very top echelon; but a more expansive view
might include small business owners and others living a relatively
comfortable existence in a generally impoverished country. Because
the concept of wealth is so indeterminate, the proposed group could
vary from as little as 1 percent to as much as 20 percent of the
population, or more.
The respondents' proposed social group is indeterminate, and not
just at the margins, as will often be the case in describing group
membership. Rather, when "wealth" is the sole criterion, group
membership is difficult to delimit for a large swath of potential
members. The characteristic of wealth or affluence is simply too
subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide the sole basis for
membership in a particular social group.28 7
Thus, the BIA ultimately held that the social visibility and particularity
tests could not be satisfied on the facts; therefore, wealthy Guatemalans did
not constitute a particular social group for the purposes of INA § 101(a)(42).
Both Matter of C-A- and Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U- represent a
significant departure from the precedent set out in Acosta. Whether the BIA
is applying "social visibility" and "particularity" as an important factor or
essential requirement in all social group cases, it still represents a sudden,
significant, and unexplained departure from Acosta and other precedents, not
to mention international authorities. The BIA's new emphasis on social
visibility undermines the principled framework for analyzing social group
claims set forth in Acosta and will lead to incoherent, inconsistent decisions.
Moreover, the decisions failed to follow the sequential steps set out in the
UNHCR Guidelines, which explicitly provide that social perception should
be considered only if there is no protected characteristic-in other words, as
alternative tests, as opposed to additional mandatory requirements.
In two subsequent cases, the BIA attempted to provide some additional
clarification as to how these concepts should be applied, and additionally,
somewhat illuminated the reasoning in adopting social visibility and
particularity.
In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA considered whether "Salvadoran youths
who have resisted gang recruitment [into the MS-13 criminal gang], or

287. Id. at 76.
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family members of such Salvadoran youth" constituted a particular social
group. 288 In its analysis, the BIA stated that not only would the group
members need to share an immutable or fundamental characteristic, but they
must also "have particular and well-defined boundaries . . . and . .. possess a

recognized level of social visibility." 28 9 The ruling, in effect, affirmed that
social visibility and particularity are requirements in the particular social
group analysis giving "greater specificity to the definition of a social
group." 290
Matter of E-A-G- provided the BIA with further opportunity to provide
clarification to the newly articulated social visibility requirement. 29' The
BIA stated:
In recent years, we have issued a line of cases reaffirming the
particular social group formula set forth in Matter ofAcosta .

.

. and

providing further clarification regarding its proper application. See
Matter ofA-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2007) (indicating that young
Bambara women who oppose arranged marriage were not a
particular social group); Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec.
69, 74-75 (BIA 2007) (holding that "affluent Guatemalans" did not
constitute a particular social group); Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec.
951, 959-61 (BIA 2006) (finding that noncriminal informants
working against the Cali drug cartel in Colombia were not a
particular social group), aff'd, Castillo-Ariasv. U.S. Att'y Gen., 446
F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied sub nom. Castillo-Arias v.
Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 977 (2007). In each of these cases, we
emphasized that the purported group's social visibility i.e., the
extent to which members of a society perceive those with the
characteristic in question as members of a social group-is of
particular importance in determining whether an alien is a member
of a claimed particular social group . . . .292
The BIA held that there was no societal perception that members of the
claimed group of "persons resistant to gang membership" was a cognizable
group within society. 293

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008).
Id. at 582.
Id.
Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008).
Id. at 594.
Id.
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In 2014, in Matter of M-E-V-G- and Matter of W-G-R-, the BIA
addressed the uncertainties and provided some clarification regarding the
two new requirements. 294 In each of these decisions, the BIA clarified that
social visibility was never intended to require a literal or ocular visibility. 295
Rather, "[t]o be socially distinct, a group need not be seen by society; it must
instead be perceived as a group by society .... Members of the group may
be visibly recognizable, but society can also consider persons to be a group
without being able to identify the members by sight." 296 Thus, it is not
essential that the protected characteristics that define the group are visible on
sight. In fact, in an effort to avoid any potential for further confusion, the
BIA, in Matter of W-G-R-, renamed the "social visibility" requirement to
"social distinction." 297 The BIA also clarified that the concept of
particularity is concerned with the demarcation of the group, that is "whether
the group is 'sufficiently distinct' that it would constitute a 'discrete' as
opposed to 'amorphous' group of persons."298
In summary, the BIA confirmed:
[T]hat an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal seeking
relief based on "membership in a particular social group" must
establish that the group is
(1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic;
(2) defined with particularity and;
(3) socially distinct within the society in question. 299
In Matter of M-E- V-G-, the BIA considered the purported group of
"Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but who have
refused to join because they oppose the gangs." 300 The BIA held that the
group was not perceived as a distinct group in Honduran society and further

294. Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 240-41 (BIA 2014); Matter of W-G-R-, 26
I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014).
295. W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 216 (citing Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081,
1087-89 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)); M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 234.
296. W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 216-17 (citing In re C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 956-57 (BIA
2006)).
297. Id. at 216 (citing Henriquiez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1087-89); M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec.
at 228.
298. W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 210 (citing Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579, 584 (BIA
2008)).
299. Id. at 208; M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 237.
300. M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 228.
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that the group was not particularly defined.301 In Matter of W-G-R-, "former
members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang
membership" were not found to be a particular social group because its
boundaries were too general and wide-ranging, and there was no evidence to
suggest the group was viewed as distinct from society at large.3 02
Thus, the jurisprudence in the United States regarding the meaning of
particular social group is currently unclear and replete with vague definitions
and concepts. In particular, the inclusion of the new social visibility and
particularity requirements has resulted in a narrow and somewhat harsh
construction of the term particular social group. This obviously makes it
very difficult for applicants to predict the likely outcome of their
applications and engenders an unsatisfactory degree of uncertainty within
this area of law. However, it is clear that the requirement for an immutable
characteristic remains central to the test of particular social group.
D. Australia
The position in the United States regarding the meaning of a particular
social group can be contrasted with that adopted in Australia. As noted
above, the "social perception" approach is the dominant approach in
Australian jurisprudence. This test was first set out by the High Court of
Australia in Applicant A.303

As noted by Justice Dawson, a particular social group is a group of
persons "who share a certain characteristic or element which unites them and
enables them to be set apart from society at large. That is to say, not only
must such persons exhibit some common element; the element must unite
them, making those who share it a cognizable group within their society." 3 04
In other terms, the existence of a particular social group ultimately turns on
whether the group shares a common attribute and as a result may be
perceived as a distinct group within their society.
In Applicant A, Justice McHugh further explained:
The use of [the term "membership"] in conjunction with "particular
social group" connotes persons who are defined as a distinct social
group by reason of some characteristic, attribute, activity, belief,
interest or goal that unites them. If the group is perceived by people

301. Id. at 249.
302. W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. at 221-22.
303. Applicant A & Another v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs & Another
(1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.).
304. Id. at 241.
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in the relevant country as a particular social group, it will usually
but not always be the case that they are members of such a group.
Without some form of internal linking or unity of characteristics,
attributes, activities, beliefs, interests or goals, however, it is
unlikely that a collection of individuals will or can be perceived as
being a particular social group. Those indiscriminately killed or
robbed by guerillas, for example, are not a particular social

group. 305
The main point of contrast between the American and Australian
position is that the Australian interpretation does not require the substratum
for the claim to particular social group to be an immutable characteristic.
Rather, the analysis falls on the "external perceptions of the group." 306 The
High Court did not follow the BIA's approach in aligning the particular
social group ground with the other four Convention grounds, and as such,
the social perception approach is more likely to catch a broader range of
groups. This is also recognized in the UNHCR Guidelines which state the

following:
For example, the social perception standard might recognize as
social groups associations based on a characteristic that is neither
immutable nor fundamental to human dignity such as, perhaps,
occupation or social class. 307
The High Court also acknowledged the widely accepted position that
persecution or the fear of persecution will not satisfy as the uniting attribute
so as to avoid the ground becoming a catch-all. 308 However, persecutory
conduct on the basis of a characteristic may be a factor in establishing that
the group is socially recognizable within a society. As noted by Justice

McHugh:
[W]hile persecutory conduct cannot define the social group, the
actions of the persecutors may serve to identify or even cause the
creation of a particularsocial group in society. Left-handed men
are not a particular social group. But, if they were persecuted
because they were left-handed, they would no doubt quickly
become recognizable in their society as a particular social group.

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 264-65.
Id. at 264.
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection, supra note 223, at 3.
Applicant A, 190 CLR at 242.
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Their persecution for being left-handed would create a public
perception that they were a particular social group. But it would be
the attribute of being left-handed and not the persecutory acts that
would identify them as a particular social group. 309
Ultimately, the court rejected the proposed social group of "those who
having only one child do not accept the limitations placed on them or who
are coerced or forced into being sterilized" by China's One Child policy on
the basis that "there was no social attribute or characteristic linking the
couples, nothing external that would allow them to be perceived as a
particular social group for Convention purposes. "310
The meaning of particular social group was again considered by the
High Court of Australia in 2004 in Applicant S v Ministerfor Immigration
and MulticulturalAffairs. 311 Applicant S confirms that it is not a mandatory
requirement to show that the group in question is perceived as a collection of
individuals that comprises a particular social group. Rather, social
recognition of group status is merely an evidential consideration that can
assist in determining whether the collection of individuals are objectively set
apart from other members of society and united by a common characteristic.
Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices Gummow and Kirby noted the following:
[P]erceptions held by the community may amount to evidence that a
social group is a cognisable group within the community. The
general principle is not that the group must be recognised or
perceived within the society, but rather that the group must be
distinguished from the rest of the society. 3 12
In rejecting it as a mandatory requirement, the High Court reasoned:
Communities may deny the existence of particular social groups
because the common attribute shared by members of the group
offends religious or cultural beliefs held by a majority of the
community. Those communities do not recognise or perceive the

309. Id at 264.
310. Id at 269-70.
311. Applicant S v Ministerfor Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR
387, 400 (AustI.).
312. Id at 397-98.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/5

46

Bagaric: Revisiting the Definition of Particular Social Group in the Refug

2017]

AMELIORATING THE DISPLACED PERSON'S CRISIS

167

existence of the particular social group, but it cannot be said that the
particular social group does not exist.313
In summary, the finding of a particular social group, as articulated by
Chief Justice Gleeson and Justices Gummow and Kirby in a joint judgment,
falls on the following three factors:
First, the group must be identifiable by a characteristic or attribute
common to all members of the group. Secondly, the characteristic
or attribute common to all members of the group cannot be the
shared fear of persecution. Thirdly, the possession of that
characteristic or attribute must distinguish the group from society at
large. Borrowing the language of [Justice Dawson] in ApplicantA, a
group that fulfils the first two propositions, but not the third, is
merely a "social group" and not a "particular social group." As this
Court has repeatedly emphasised, identifying accurately the
"particular social group" alleged is vital for the accurate application
of the applicable law to the case in hand.3 14
E.

Canada

The leading authority on the definition of a particular social group in
Canada is the decision of Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward.315 The
Supreme Court of Canada adopted a relatively narrow reading of the term so
as to avoid the ground becoming a "safety net to prevent any possible gap"
in protection, and thereby rendering the other four Convention grounds
effectively redundant.3 16

Justice La Forest reasoned that the meaning of membership in a
particular social group should take into account "the general underlying
themes of the defence of human rights and anti-discrimination that form the
basis for the international refugee protection initiative. "317
Accordingly, a particular social group, as defined by Justice La Forest,
includes the following three categories: (1) groups defined by an innate or
unchangeable characteristic; (2) groups whose members voluntarily
associate for reasons so fundamental to their human dignity that they should

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
211 (BIA

Id at 400.
Id at 400-01.
Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
Id. at 728, 740.
Id. at 739 (following the approach of a U.S. case, Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec.
1985)).
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not be forced to forsake the association; and (3) groups associated by a
former voluntary status, unalterable due to its historical permanence. 318
Thus, the approach set out by the Supreme Court of Canada goes
beyond that espoused in Acosta by recognizing groups beyond those which
share a characteristic that is immutable. For example, the second category
includes voluntary associations based on characteristics that are fundamental
to human dignity but perhaps changeable. One example used by the court is
human rights activists. 319

Under this standard, the court ultimately found that the Irish National
Liberation Army (INLA), of which the claimant was a former member, did
not constitute a particular social group because his membership status was
not an immutable characteristic in the sense that it could be altered, nor was
it "unalterable due to its historical permanence." 320 The court further held
that his fear was not based on his past membership in the INLA and stated
that his membership "placed him in the circumstances that led to his fear,
but the fear itself was based on his action, not his affiliation." 321
In the subsequent case of Chan v. Canada (Minister ofEmployment and
Immigration), Justice La Forest revisited the second category of potential
particular social groups he had set out in Ward. 322 He clarified that the
categories enunciated were working rules only, as opposed to absolute rules,
and in relation to category two, "a refugee alleging membership in a
particular social group does not have to be in a voluntary association with
other persons similar to him or herself." 323

V.

THE PREFERRED DEFINITION OF PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

Thus, it follows from the above discussion that there is no consistent or
established jurisprudence regarding the meaning of particular social group.
The manner in which the term is interpreted varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. We have seen that the definition adopted in the United States is
probably the narrowest interpretation of the countries that have been
examined in this Article. Given the lack of consensus and innate uncertainty
regarding the meaning of particular social group, it is opportune to critically
evaluate the manner in which this concept should be interpreted and applied.

318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
(Can.).
323.

Id
Id
Id at 744.
Id. at 693.
Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593
Id. at 597.
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In interpreting the meaning of particular social group, there are a
number of fundamental assumptions and principles which should guide this
analysis. Firstly, it is unquestionable that the historical and normative
backdrop to the Convention should guide the manner in which it is
interpreted, including the meaning of particular social group. Secondly, for
any proposed new interpretation to be tenable it must be cognizant of
existing jurisprudence and contemporary values and needs. There has been a
large degree of analysis in the United States context regarding the meaning
of particular social group, and there is a degree of clarity regarding the
theoretical test which is applied to determine if a person fits within this
category of asylum seeker. In practice, however, the test that has been
proposed is so vague and impressionistic that there is often a large degree of
uncertainty and unpredictability regarding whether a trait falls within a
particular social group. As we have seen, there is no agreed standard for
determining, for example, whether or not a characteristic is immutable and
whether the social visibility test is satisfied. Accordingly, it follows that a
proposed reform to this definition will not undercut the desirability for
certainty and predictability in the law.
Also, as we have seen, the history and drafting of the Convention
provide very little concrete guidance regarding the meaning that should be
attributed to particular social group. The UNHCR has indicated what it
believes to be the preferred definition; however, its views do not carry any
persuasive weight, apart from the intrinsic coherence of its argument. Thus,
it follows that there are few historical anchors which forcefully compel a
specific definition of particular social group. Accordingly, the main drivers
of a preferred definition are the intention behind the Convention overall,
contemporary needs, and pragmatic political and social realities.
Further, the broad objective underpinning refugee law is to provide a
coherent and clear pathway for people that are persecuted in their homeland
to obtain sanctuary in other countries that have the means to facilitate their
entry and residence. For this to be achieved, it is necessary to have a
definition setting the profile of people who qualify for asylum. The
definition adopted in the Convention has a number of key integers, including
that the person must be outside their homeland and have a fear of
persecution. As we have seen, the persecution must also be for one or more
of five enumerated grounds.
In assessing these integers, it is important to distinguish between those
that are core to the nature of a refugee and those which are incidental. To
this end, it is clear that fear of persecution is a central element to the
definition. It is this situation that drives people from their homelands and
simultaneously often engenders empathy for them by other people, even
those living in other countries. The need for persecution is in fact the entire
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fulcrum around which refugee law and practice is based. This is evident
from the fact that people who are of the exact profile of refugees but seek
asylum for other reasons, such as economic prosperity, are habitually and
consistently refused sanctuary in other countries.
In principle, there is no need for a person who is in fear of being
persecuted to be outside of their homeland and in desperate need of asylum
elsewhere. International borders are in effect simply invisible lines on the
earth's surface. Whether or not a person is one meter within or outside their
country of origin should not make a difference regarding their eligibility for
refugee status. However, this requirement, while having no normative basis,
does have a pragmatic underpinning. It is used as a mechanism to distinguish
and thereby limit the amount of displaced people who can apply for refugee
status under the Convention. If this was not in existence, there would be a
risk that countries would be overwhelmed by applications under the Refugee
Convention and therefore inclined to withdraw from their obligations under
the Convention.
When it comes to the current grounds in the Convention, different
considerations emerge. There is no logical or normative reason for limiting
refugee status to these grounds. As we have seen, this is nearly a matter of
historical accident, stemming from the profile of most of the people who
were in fear of persecution at the time of the Convention's drafting. Further,
there was no principled reason for limiting refugee status to these five
grounds at the time the Convention was drafted. In addition to this, there was
clearly no express desire to provide a narrow meaning to particular social
group. In fact, there was virtually no consideration given to this concept. To
the extent that some express consideration was given to this ground, it seems
like it was designed to provide a vehicle through which the criteria for
refugee status could evolve as political and social factors changed over time.
Moreover, it is important in interpreting any legal instrument that moral
considerations guide the analysis, at least to the extent that they are not
undercut by existing jurisprudence. It is important to note that whether or not
a person qualifies as a refugee can have a profound, often life-changing
effect on the person. It is an incontestable moral truth that, to the extent
possible, decisions that have a central impact on peoples' lives should be
made by reference to clear and defensible standards as opposed to arbitrary
norms.
In addition to this, there is no doubt that the world is experiencing an
almost unprecedented crisis regarding the amount of displaced people, many
of whom qualify as refugees according to current understandings or who
could qualify subject to minor changes to the definition of a refugee.
From the above analysis, it follows that particular social group should
be interpreted in an inclusive and broad manner. As we have seen, there is
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no principled or historical reason that the ground should relate only to
immutable characteristics. This is especially true given that there is no clear
definition of an immutable characteristic. The core aspect of this term is
membership in a group. The other clear aspect of the definition is that it
must to some degree have social recognition or positioning. The definition
of particular social group which is the most defensible is that adopted by the
High Court of Australia. As we have seen, this has three different
requirements, none of which include the requirement that the relevant trait is
immutable. This requirement does not seem to have any basis in logic,
history, or jurisprudence. It should be abolished. This would result in a far
greater number of people being able to use the Refugee Convention as a
basis for asylum without undermining the legal or normative integrity of the
Convention.
The definition of a particular social group in Australia, while somewhat
obscure in its application, allows for the acceptance of a far greater number
of traits and behaviors to come within the scope of particular social group.
The definition is so broad that it would allow not only narrow subgroups to
be recognized, for example, alcoholics in Iran,3 24 but also extremely wide
characteristics, such as being a female. In fact, it has been postulated that
this trait of itself comes within the meaning of particular social group in
Australia. 325
In addition to this, other broad characteristics which are not immutable
could also qualify under the Australian definition but are unlikely to be
consistent with current United States case law. This expansion would
include people who have avoided military service, members of a stigmatized
professional group or trade union, and people employed or living in regional
areas. 326 This approach would have the advantage of considerably expanding
the number of people who would be eligible for resettlement in the United
States on the basis of their refugee status. It would also make the law more
coherent and considerably improve the amount of net humans flourishing in
the world.

324. Tessa Akerman, Iranian Man Who Can't Stop Drinking May Get Refugee Status,
(Dec. 27, 2016, 12:00 AM), http://www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/immigaration/Iranian-man-who-cant- stop-drinking-may-get-refugee-status/news-story/
d417f0c05042c7aeb5487fcd9.
325. JOHN VRACHNAS ET AL., MIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
PRACTICE IN AUSTRALIA 216 (3d ed. 2012).
326. Id. at 218.
AUSTRALIAN,
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VI. INCREASING THE REFUGEE QUOTA

In this part, I discuss the second aspect of my solution to ameliorating
the current refugee and displaced person crisis. This solution involves the
United States considerably increasing its intake of offshore refugees. The
current United States intake of refugees consists of two main cohorts. There
are onshore refugees who are also called asylees.3 27 These figures vary from
year to year, but the most recent data shows that there are generally around
26,000 asylees.3 28 The second cohort is offshore refugees. 329 This figure also
varies, and the refugee ceiling for Fiscal Year 2017 stands at 110,000, an
increase of 25,000 from Fiscal Year 2016, although as noted earlier, the
refugee quota has recently been halved.330
These projections are now somewhat speculative given that, as indicated
in the Introduction to this Article, President Trump in March 2017 put a
freeze on refugee arrivals and has halved the refugee quota.33' These
changes make the proposal in this part of the Article even more important
and pressing. This is because the United States should in fact significantly
increase the number of refugees it admits rather than suspending refugee
arrivals.
In objective terms, the 110,000 refugee quota established by the
previous United States administration is a considerable number but,
relatively speaking, the United States still lags behind other developed
countries in terms of its pro rata acceptance of offshore refugees. Australia,
for example, accepts approximately 10,000 people offshore annually and has
a population that is approximately less than 10% of the United States.33 2 The
collective sympathy demonstrated by the United States for admitting
refugees is also significantly dwarfed by the empathy expressed by other
developed countries. Figures in 2016 show that Sweden admitted almost

327. Refugees & Asylum, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, at 1,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum (last updated Nov. 12, 2015).
328. MOSSAAD, supra note 20, at 1.
329. Refugees & Asylum, supra note 327, at 1.
330. BRUNO, supra note 21, at 2.
33 1. As noted, at the time of the writing of this Article, this freeze had been halted by a
U.S. Appeals Court. See Liptak, supra note 13, at 1, 5-6.
332. See Australia's Offshore Humanitarian Programme: 2013-2014, DEP'T
IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION (DIBP) (2014), https://www.border.gov.au/
ReportsandPublications/Documents/statistics/australia-offshore-humanitarian-program-201314.pdf; Department ofImmigration and Border ProtectionAnnual Report 2014-2015, DEP'T
IMMIGRATION
AND
BORDER
PROTECTION
(DIBP)
(2015),
https://www.border.gov.au/ReportsandPublications/Documents/annual-reports/DIBP-Annual-

Report-2014-15.pdf
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exactly the same number of refugees and asylum seekers as the United
States, yet its population is approximately 10 million. Germany, which has a
population less than one-third the size of the United States, has admitted four
times as many asylum seekers. Even relatively poor developed countries
such as Greece and Spain have on a pro rata basis admitted far more asylum
seekers .333
The United States is the world's leading and largest economy. It is also
the world's third biggest country based on land mass.334 It has more capacity
and a greater financial ability to absorb more people than perhaps any other
country on earth. In addition, at the geopolitical level, it is the most
influential nation on earth and has assumed a role as a democratic and moral
exemplar to other nations. The flipside of this is that the United States is
morally and politically obliged to meaningfully assist in ameliorating
international crises.
As we have seen, the number of displaced people is the greatest modernday crisis, as defined by the amount of net human suffering that has and
continues to be caused. The number of displaced people is currently at
unprecedented levels. While displaced people come from certain
geographical regions, the world is now far more integrated than at any point
in human history, and the moral responsibilities of individuals and countries
are universal. All countries have a duty to assist in accommodating the
burgeoning number of displaced people. There is no clear cut, optimal
number of displaced people that each country should absorb. As noted by
Peter Singer in the context of Australia's refugee quota (the same normative
argument applies in the context of the United States refugee quota):
[T]here is a strong case for Australia to double its refugee intake.
But there was nothing in the argument that relied on the specific
level of refugees now being taken by Australia. If this argument
goes through, it would also seem to follow that Australia should be
taking not an extra 12,000 refugees, but an extra 24,000 refugees a
year. Now the argument seems to be going too far, for it can then be
reapplied to this new level: should Australia be taking 48,000
refugees? We can double and redouble the intakes of all the major
nations of the developed world, and the refugee camps around the

333. 2016 Report: Situation of Refugees in Spain and Europe Executive Summary,
COMISION ESPANOLA DE AYUDA AL REFUGIADO (2016); Greece: A Year of Suffering for

Asylum Seekers, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Mar. 15, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/
news.2017/03/15/Greece-year-suffering-aslyum-seekers.
334. The World Fact Book, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2147rank.html (last updated July 25, 2017).
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world will still not be empty. Indeed, the number of refugees who
would seek resettlement in the developed countries is not fixed, and
probably there is some truth in the claim that if all those now in
refugee camps were to be accepted, more refugees would arrive to
take their places. Since the interests of the refugees in resettlement
in a more prosperous country will always be greater than the
conflicting interests of the residents of those countries, it would
seem that the principles of equal consideration of interests points to
a world in which all countries continue to accept refugees until they
are reduced to the same standard of poverty and overcrowding as
the third world countries from which the refugees are seeking to
flee.335

Thus, there is no clear number of refugees which a developed country is
normatively obliged to absorb. However, it is clear that by relative
standards, the United States is shirking its responsibility to accommodate the
growing number of displaced people. There is a desperate and unequivocal
need for the United States to increase its refugee numbers. Thus, a fivefold
increase is tenable, given the current resources the United States has. I
suggest that the intake needs to be incrementally increased to 500,000. This
is of course a significant number of people; however, the number is tenable
because it is in fact less than the annual intake of Germany in 2015, which
has a far smaller land size, population, and gross domestic product than the
United States. 336

The benefit that would flow from increasing the refugee intake to
500,000 annually would not only manifest in the immense enhanced
flourishing of the new arrivals, but it would extend to the United States
being able to demonstrably and persuasively establish itself as a world leader
in the approach to settling displaced people. It could then legitimately and
effectively exert moral pressure on other developed countries to also
proportionately increase their own refugee numbers and thereby provide an
overarching solution to the current displaced person crisis. This approach
and prospective has perhaps never been more important in recorded United

335. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS, at 260-61 (2d ed. 1993).
336. Germany on Course to Accept One Million Refugees in 2015, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8,
2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/Germany-on-course-to-accept-onemillion-refugees-in-2015. In 2016, Germany's refugee intake dropped to approximately
300,000. See Agence France-Presse, Germany Expects up to 300,000 Refugees in 2016,
Official Says, GUARDIAN, at 1 (Aug. 28, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
aug/28/germany-300000-refugees-2016-bamf.
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States history, given the magnitude of the displaced person crisis and the
recent move by the Trump Administration to suspend refugee arrivals.
VII. CONCLUSION

The number of displaced people in the world is currently at a record
high. Governments around the world have been unable to find a mechanism
for dealing with the rising tide of desperate people leaving their country of
origin in search of a safe destination for themselves and their families. A
large portion of the 65 million displaced people are refugees. The legal
instrument, which for the past six decades has provided the platform for
facilitating asylum for more displaced people than any other, is the 1951
Refugee Convention. Despite the fact that more than 140 countries are
signatories to the Convention, this instrument has been ineffective in
meaningfully reducing refugee numbers in light of the current massive
growth in displaced people.
There is currently no strategy for significantly reducing the number of
displaced people in the world. Regrettably, recent developments indicate an
overall hardening by many countries in their willingness to accept more
displaced people. The United States in particular has indicated that it is
likely to absorb less displaced people.
In this Article, I have argued that the current hardening towards
displaced people is misguided and morally objectionable. All countries on
earth share some responsibility for accommodating displaced people. This
responsibility is especially acute in relation to the United States, given that it
is one of the largest countries on earth and economically the most powerful
and well-off country.
In order for the United States to coherently and systematically increase
its refugee intake, I have proposed two reforms. The first is that the
definition of particular social group in the Refugee Convention should be
expanded, consistent with the approach taken in Australia. This would
remove the need for immutable characteristics to be an essential requirement
to satisfy this refugee ground. The effect of this would be to broaden
significantly the number of people who could qualify as refugees under the
Convention. This broader perspective is consistent with the rationale and
history of the Refugee Convention and could be implemented in a coherent
and systematic fashion.
The other reform I have suggested is that the United States proactively
settle many more displaced people that are currently located in refugee
camps around the world. It should lift its quota to approximately 500,000
people per year from the current 110,000. This is commensurate with the
economic and social capacity of the United States to absorb more destitute
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people and would set a desirable example for other first world countries,
thereby significantly ameliorating the displaced person crisis. My proposal
will not provide a total solution to the displaced person crisis; however, the
approach I take in this Article will hopefully provide a catalyst for a more
critical and humanistic approach and reinterpretation of other potential
pathways for displaced people to gain asylum.
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